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simpler query language than that in the WSQ model.  In [GY88,GN93] it has been
shown that whereas the query languages in the parametric model handles the natural
language constructs “or”, “and”, and “not” symmetrically, the languages that use tuple
timestamps do not achieve this symmetry.  The same arguments in [GY88,GN93]
would reveal a lack of symmetry in the WSQ model as well as in other models in mul-
tilevel security literature.  
 Another advantage of the parametric model is that it leads to a seamless integration
of ordinary, temporal, spatial, and belief data.  This integration in the parametric model
would be much tighter than the integration of temporal and multilevel security data in
[PM94].  
The identities in the parametric model and algebraic optimization has been dis-
cussed in [NG92].  That approach to algebraic optimization also applies to the para-
metric model for multilevel security.  
Lastly it must be remembered that the data in the real world has more complex
structure than 1nf.  If our language seems simpler, it is because it has imitated the
“real” structure rather then temper with it to fit the 1nf mold.  In fact, the structure of
multilevel security data is far more complex than what is covered in this paper in terms
of u-polyinstantiation.  Key-polyinstantiation represents the true form of polyinstantia-
tion, and this form of polyinstantiation has been covered extensively in our works dur-
ing the last decade.  In particular, key-polyinstantiation in multilevel security has been
covered in [CG97a,CG97b].  
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Example 15.  Now we consider the query list all names I do not believe exist but some
lower users do.  In the two models this query is expressed as follows.
WSQ model: (select Name from emp believed by anyone)
minus
(select Name from emp believed by self)
Parametric model: select Name 
from emp e
where me ∉[[e]]
In the WSQ model the following SQL-like expression is mentioned, and it is stated
that the expression will not work for the given query. 
select Name
from emp
believed by anyone
where Name not in    ( select Name
from emp
believed by self)
As seen above, the SQL query for the parametric model is simpler and the user may
not feel a need for such a complex expression form because in the parametric model
the  information about a single object resides in a single tuple.  Even if such informa-
tion resided in different tuples, query in SQL for the parametric model would be as fol-
lows, and the problem stated in [WSQ94] would not arise.  
select e.Name
from emp e
where e.Name ↓
 
e.owner not in ( select e′.Name
 restricted to e.owner
from emp e′
where me ∈ [[e′]])
8.  Conclusions 
This paper has shown a fundamental relationship that exists between the parametric
model and multilevel security databases.  It has also shown how the parametric model
for temporal data readily adapts to multilevel security.  In this venture, the only
changes in the temporal model are as follows:
• Change of the term instant (of time) to the term user (or user level)
• Change of the term temporal element to user element
• Derivation of user hierarchy in multilevel security as a special case of the user hier-
archy in a generic parametric model. 
An exhaustive comparison between the WSQ and the parametric models under u-
polyinstantiation was given.  It has been found that the parametric model leads to a
1. Note “emp e” creates alias e of the emp relation; this is not a cross product of emp and e
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Example 10.  The query list all users who believe in the existence of John is expressed
in the two algebras as follows:
WSQ model: ΠLabel((σ(emp, Name = John) × self) ↑ anyone)
Parametric model: [[σ(emp, Name = John)]]
Example 11.  The query list the beliefs about John’s department is expressed in an
SQL-like languages in WSQ and the parametric models as follows.
WSQ model: select Dept, Label
from emp, self
believed by anyone
where Name = John
Parametric model: select Dept
from emp
where Name = John
Example 12.  List the names of all employees anyone believes to exist.
WSQ model: ΠName (emp) ↑ anyone
Parametric model: ΠName (emp)
Example 13.  Consider the query list all names everyone believes to exist.  This query
is expressed in the algebra of the WSQ model as follows.
WSQ model:ΠName (emp) − 
ΠName (ΠName (emp) × anyone − ((ΠName (emp) × self) ↑ anyone)  
The above expression is complex because it has to handle the quantifier “for all”
(∀) at the relation level.  However, note that the English query does not involve quan-
tification at the relational level, but only at the object level.  Though relational level
quantifications would be complex in the algebra for parametric model, the object level
quantification would not.  In the algebra of the parametric model it is expressed as fol-
lows.    
parametric model:  ΠName σ(emp, [[ ]] = Users, ) 
Example 14.  The query list employee names believed to exist at my level but at no
level below me is expressed in the two models as follows.
WSQ model: select Name 
from emp 
where Name not in ( select Name 
from emp 
believed by (select Label 
from anyone
where Label not in ( select
from self)))
Parametric model: select Name
from emp e1
where [[e]] = me
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metric model, when a user poses a query, the query is executed for the whole database,
and if the user wants to restrict the computation to a level u, every operand relation
should be restricted to u by the user.  On the other hand, in the WSQ model when a
user u poses a query, it is evaluated for the data at level u.  If the user wants to involve
the data at additional levels, it should use  “↑ U” explicitly in the query.  This differ-
ence by itself is not a shortcoming of either of the two models. 
The identities for the e↓ φ operator in the parametric model stated above are a direct
counterpart of those in the WSQ model.  In particular, observe that in the parametric
model the identity (e1 − e2) ↓  µ = (e1 ↓  µ) − (e2 ↓  µ) holds.  Thus the difference oper-
ator in the parametric model is well behaved.  We note that the e↓ φ operator in the
parametric model works cleanly in every conceivable context.  Consider the following
remarks about the level shift operator e ↑ U in the WSQ model.   
• It is stated in [WSQ94] that because of the unary nature of relation U in the level
shift operator e ↑ U, U cannot be involved in a projection, a selection or a cartesian
product.  In the parametric model these possibilities do not arise because the domain
expressions are not relations, they are simply time domains.  In addition, the syntax
they lead to is simple, powerful, and uniform.     
• It is stated in [WSQ94] that U cannot involve the difference operator.  In the para-
metric model no such problem arises: e ↓ (µ1 − µ2) is allowed, and the natural identity
e ↓  (µ1 − µ2) = e ↓  µ1 − e ↓  µ2 holds.  
• It is also stated in [WSQ94] that a cascade of level shift operators does not give rise
to interesting identities in general.  This is not a problem in the parametric model,
where the natural identity (e ↓  µ1) ↓  µ2 = e ↓  (µ1∩ µ2) holds.
7.  Querying the multilevel security data
In the following we exhaustively cover all queries from [WSQ94]1.  Let’s compare
how these queries are expressed in the WSQ and the parametric models.  We find that
the parametric model, where the queries are usually simpler than those in the WSQ
model has a distinct advantage.  Recall that the constant me stands for the user who
submits a query.  We will now use the variable Users to denote the space of all user
levels.    
Example 9.  List my belief about John’s department.  For this query, the expressions in
the algebras of the WSQ and parametric models are given below.  The expressions
illustrate the difference in the defaults used in the two models.  In the WSQ model the
query is executed only on the data at the level where the query is submitted.  On the
other hand in the parametric model it would be executed on the whole database, neces-
sitating explicit restriction to me.    
WSQ model: ΠDept σ(emp, Name = John)
Parametric model: ΠDept σ (emp, Name = John, me)
1. Note that all the queries in this section have appeared in [WSQ94].  They have been
adapted to the emp relation, our running example. 
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The results of a level shift operator can be unexpected.  As evidence, we observe
that (e1−e2)↑µ can be a proper superset of (e1↑µ) −  (e2↑µ).  This is shown in the fol-
lowing counter example.  
Example 8.  Consider the database scheme {r (A), s(A)}.  Suppose that the instances
of r(A) and s(B) at different levels are as follows:
u3: {a,b} and ∅, respectively.1
u2: {a,b} and {a}, respectively.
u1: {a,b} and {b}, respectively.
Given the above, we have 
(r − s)↑anyone = ({a,b} − ∅) ∪ ({a,b} − {a}) ∪ ({a,b} − {b}) = {a,b}
r↑anyone = {a,b} ∪ {a,b} ∪ {a,b} = {a,b}
s↑anyone = ∅ ∪ {a} ∪ {b} = {a,b}
r↑anyone − s↑anyone = ∅
Therefore, (r−s)↑anyone is a proper superset of r↑anyone − s↑anyone. •  
In contrast, in the parametric model the relational difference operator will always
behave as expected.  The reason for this is that in the parametric model the user level
can never be separated from a value;  thus, the distinction between a value such as 55K
at two different user levels is not ignored by the system.  
6.1. The restriction operator in the parametric model
Now it is time to introduce an operator that comes closest to the level shift operator
of WSQ.  Recall the 1-3-selection, σ (e, , φ), for the parametric model for multilevel
security.  Here φ is a domain expressions, and as explained above φ is very versatile: it
consists of subqueries that are relational, domain, and boolean expressions.  We will
use the abbreviation e↓ φ for σ (e, , φ).2  The operator e↓ φ is called the restriction
operator.  The following identities could be proved for the restriction operator:
• ΠX(e) ↓  µ = ΠX(e ↓  µ)
• σ (e, φ) ↓  µ = σ (e ↓  µ, φ)
• (e1 ∪ e2) ↓  µ = (e1 ↓  µ) ∪ (e2 ↓  µ)
• (e1 − e2) ↓  µ = (e1 ↓  µ) − (e2 ↓  µ)
• e ↓  (µ1 ∪ µ2) =  e ↓  µ1 ∪ e ↓  µ2
It is appropriate to think of e↓ φ in the parametric model as the counterpart of the
level shift operator e ↑ U.  The reader should be cautioned that the two operators are
duals of each other because of the way defaults work in the two models.  In the para-
1. Strictly speaking {a,b} should be written as {〈a〉,〈b〉}.  
2. In [Ga88] e↓ φ was written as eφ.  Note the use of the down arrow in e↓ φ, as opposed
to the up arrow in the level shift operator e ↑ U.   The arrow direction seem appropriate: the
restriction operator  e↓ φ removes information from e, whereas the level shift operator e ↑
U adds information to e.  
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• The above query disregards the source levels in the final result.  If this information
is desired, instead of the query “emp↑ anyone”, one can pose the query
“(emp×self)↑ anyone”, which gives rise to the relation shown in Figure 8 (b).   Note
that the information contained in this relation is the same as that in the relation of Fig-
ure 1(b), which is the counterpart of a temporal relation with tuple label stamping. •   
As seen above, there are two types of operators in the WSQ model: the classical
operators and the level shift operator.  The classical operators obviously satisfy the
classical identities.  For the level shift operator, [WSQ94] lists several identities; the
following is a sampling:1  
• ΠX(e) ↑ µ = ΠX(e ↑ µ)
• σ (e, φ) ↑ µ = σ (e ↑ µ, φ)
• (e1 ∪ e2) ↑ µ = (e1 ↑ µ) ∪ (e2 ↑ µ)
• (e1 − e2) ↑ µ ⊇ (e1 ↑ µ) − (e2 ↑ µ)
• e ↑ (µ1 ∪ µ2) =  e ↑ µ1 ∪ e ↑ µ2
6.  Discussion
This section includes some general remarks about the WSQ model.  Recall the
expression U participating in the level shift operator e↑ U.  Corresponding to the
expression U in the WSQ model, the parametric model has domain expressions.  These
domain expressions are composed from the primitives Dom(u); the visibility domain
of a user, [[A]], [[AθB]], [[Aθb]], [[e]]; and operators ∪, ∩, and − .   Conceptually, the
domain expressions are conceptually very simple: they evaluate to user domains.  Note
that in particular that e, in the primitive [[e]], is an arbitrary relational expression.
Therefore the domain expressions are recursively composed from other relational,
domain, and boolean expressions.  The syntax associated with the domain expressions
is also very simple when compared to expressions such as U in the WSQ model.  (Sev-
eral examples will be given in the next section.)  
In the WSQ model there is a lack of uniformity between the stored and computed
relations.  For a given database scheme, there is an instance of that database scheme at
each user level in the stored database.  On the other hand, the computed relations are
not placed anywhere in the user hierarchy.  Even if the relation computed by e↑ U was
placed at the level of the user posing the query, a corresponding instance would not
exist at other levels.  This tends to make the  level shift operator a terminal operator:
that is, once it is applied, it cannot be applied again.  It is difficult to use a computed
relation and a stored relation as subqueries in a larger query.  In contrast, in the para-
metric model the relational scheme is the same as the one in classical databases, and
for each relation scheme in the database scheme there is only one relation in the data-
base.  No expression in the parametric model is terminal in the sense that it can be used
as a subquery of a larger query.  
1. A full discussion of the cross product for the parametric model would require a consid-
erable machinery and it is omitted from this paper.  Therefore, we have not listed an identity
involving the cross product in [WSQ94].  
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the other hand in the WSQ model when a user u poses a query to the system, the sys-
tem executes the query only on the instance of the database available to user u.  Thus a
user can perform classical operators on the relations owned by him/her.  
5.2. The level shift operator
In addition to the classical operators, the WSQ model introduces an operator, called
the level shift operator.  To ease the formalism associated with the level shift operator,
let’s first introduce a notation: if e is a relational expression, and u is a user level, then
e↑ u denotes the relation computed by the expression e with the data available only at
level u.  The level shift operator is of the form e↑ U, where e is any relational expres-
sion and U is a single column relational expression containing tuples that are user lev-
els.1
e↑ U = ∪〈u〉 ∈ U (e↑ u)
First e is evaluated at every level in U, and then the relations thus obtained are
unioned together.  
Example 7.  Let’s consider a few examples to illustrate the use of the self and anyone
relations and the level shift operator B.  In all these examples let’s assume that the que-
ries are being posed by the user u3.  
• The query “emp” returns the state of the emp relation at user level u3.  
• The query “emp↑ {〈u2〉}” returns the state of the emp relation at user level u2.    
• The query “emp↑ anyone” is more interesting.  To understand it, note that anyone at
level u3 is the relation {〈u3〉, 〈u2〉, 〈u1〉}.  Therefore, the query computes the (ordinary)
union (emp↑ u3) ∪ (emp↑ u2) ∪ (emp↑ u1).  For the given state of the database, this
computation leads to the relation shown in Figure 8 (a).   
1. To be exact, U is a relational expression which should evaluate to a single column rela-
tion containing tuples that are user levels.  
(a) The relation computed by B[anyone]emp            
(b) The relation computed by B[anyone]emp  
Figure 8. Examples of level shift operator in the WSQ model
Name Salary Dept
John 80K Toys
Tom 60K Shoes
John 50K Toys
Name Salary Dept User
John Toys 50K u1
John Toys 80K u2
Tom Shoes 60K u2
Tom Shoes 60K u3
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5.  The WSQ model for multilevel security 1
In the WSQ model, a universe {u1, u2, ⋅⋅⋅, un} of users together with ≤ is postulated.
For a given database scheme, each user in the hierarchy has his/her own level’s
instance of the database.  In addition, each user also owns two relations: “self” and
“anyone”, each a single column relation over an attribute called “Label”.  The self
relation for user u consists of the single tuple 〈u〉.  On the other hand, the anyone rela-
tion contains a tuple for the user u and each user below u.  
Example 6.  Recall that in the running example, the database scheme consists of a sin-
gle relational scheme emp with attributes Name Salary Dept.  We have also postulated
the universe {u1,u2,u3} of users, where u1 ≤ u2 and u2 ≤ u3.  As shown in Figure 5, in
the parametric model there is a single relation for all users, and every user has access
to a portion of that relation.  Figure 7 shows the multilevel security database in the
WSQ model that corresponds to the running example.  The database in the WSQ
model contains nine relations the our running example. •         
5.1. Classical relational operators
In the parametric model, when a user u poses a query, the system filters the emp
relation to Dom(u), the domain visible to u.  Thus by default the system is set to query
information belonging to u as well as information belonging to users lower than u.  On
1. For ease of reading, we make the following notational changes in syntax:  the projection
e[X] will be denoted as ΠX(e), the selection e[φ] will be denoted as σ(e, φ), and the level
shift operator B[e2]e1 (explained later in this section) will be denoted as e1↑ e2.  
               
Figure 7. A database in the WSQ model corresponding to Figure 5.  
emp self anyone
Name Salary Dept Label Label
Tom 60K Shoes u3 u3
u2
(a) The database fragment at level u3  u1
emp self anyone
Name Salary Dept Label Label
John 80K Toys u2 u2
Tom 60K Shoes u1
(b) The database fragment at level u2  
emp self anyone
Name Salary Dept Label Label
Tom 60K Shoes u1 u1
(c) The database fragment at level u1   
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user domains.  In such a case, the user u is enrolled at an existing user level and no new
user level is created.  The alternative would be to choose Dom(u) as a union of some
of the existing user domains.  This is simply a way of saying that the new user is
enrolled at a level that is immediately above the users whose domains have been
unioned.  One more condition should be added to complete the requirements for the
case of multilevel security: Dom(u) must contain the level assigned to u, allowing a
user to access his/her own data.  
In summary, whereas in a temporal database one has the freedom to enroll any num-
ber of users assigning them arbitrary domains, the corresponding assignment of user
domains in multilevel security is more constrained.  The fundamental requirement is
that a user in multilevel security should be able to see his/her own updates made to the
database.  In this sense, multilevel security is a special case of the temporal case, and
not the other way around. 
An interesting feature of the parametric approach is that Dom(u) can be integrated
in the algebra as a primitive for domain expressions to the set of existing primitives
[[A]], [[AθB]], [[Aθb]], and [[e]].  More complicated domain expressions can be formed
using ∪, ∩, and − .  This integrates the concept of a user tightly and seamlessly into the
model making the concept of user an object of complex queries. 
From now onward the terms user and user level will be interchangeably, and no con-
fusion should arise.  A few additional primitives useful for querying the parametric
model for multilevel security will be added.  
• me. When a user u poses a query, the system interprets “me” as u.   
• Below (u′). When a user u poses a query, Below (u) is interpreted as Dom(u′) − {u′}.
• Above (u′). When a user u poses a query, and u′ is visible to u, then Above (u′) is
interpreted as Dom(u′) − {u′}.    
In order to present a simple but intuitive example, assume that the relational algebra
contains a relational expression of the form “r”, where r is a relation in the stored data-
base.  
Example 5.  To adapt the running example to multilevel security, we assume the set of
users {u1, u2, u3} such that u1 ≤ u2 and u2 ≤ u3.  Suppose the user u2 wants to see the
current state of the emp relation.  To do this he/she executes the query “emp”.  The
query retrieves the result shown in Figure 6. •         
             
Figure 6. The result of the query “emp” posed by user u2
Name Salary Dept
{u2} John {u2} 80K {u2} Toys
{u2} Tom {u2} 60K {u2} Shoes
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information at least 10 years old, the analyzer has the last 5 years worth of informa-
tion, and the classical user only sees the current information (as would be the case in a
classical database). •      
4.  Parametric model for multilevel security
The parametric model for temporal data discussed in the previous sections can eas-
ily be adapted to multilevel security.  The terms instant and temporal element are
changed to user level and user element, respectively.  Corresponding to the universe of
time {t1, t2, ⋅⋅⋅, tn} in the temporal case is the universe of user levels {u1, u2, ⋅⋅⋅, un} in
multilevel security.  The relation of Figure 1 (a) in the parametric model for multilevel
security will be as shown in Figure 5.        
Note that in the parametric model for temporal data we did not impose any order
properties on the instants.  Clearly, the parametric model and its query language do not
depend upon the order properties.  In other words, if an order is imposed on the
instants, it does not change the underlying model.  The parametric model is generic,
that is, it mainly depends upon the set theoretic primitive ⊆ on parametric elements
(temporal elements and user elements).  
4.1. The user hierarchy in multilevel security
The primitive ⊆ on parametric elements leads to a user hierarchy introduced in the
previous section.  The user hierarchy gives different users access to different portions
of the database.  In the parametric model a users u1 is below u2 in the user hierarchy if
and only if Dom(u1) ⊆ Dom(u2), where Dom(u1) and Dom(u2) are the domains
assigned by the system to the users u1 and u2.  
In multilevel security one encounters a special (less general) case of the user hierar-
chy.  The difference is that in multilevel security, the domains are more rigidly deter-
mined by the system.  A partial order ≤ among the user levels is postulated and
Dom(u) is defined as {u′: u′ ≤ u}.  The following property holds in the user hierarchy:
Proposition 1.  If u1 and u2 are user levels, then u1 ≤ u2 if and only if Dom(u1) ⊆ 
Dom(u2).        
Note that the primitive Dom(⋅) of parametric databases can be used to induce a par-
tial order ≤ in a multilevel security.  To understand this, suppose we choose to use
Dom(⋅) as the primitive.  When a new user u enrolls to use the database, the Dom(u)
must be determined for that user.  One choice is to let Dom(u) be one of the existing
             
Figure 5. A relation corresponding to Figure 1 (b) for multilevel security
Name Salary Dept
{u1,u2} John {u1} 50K{u2} 80K
{u1} Toys{u2} Toys
{u2,u3} Tom {u2,u3} 60K {u2,u3} Shoes
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select X 
from r 
restricted to φ 
where f
A precise semantics of this form of select statement can be given easily in the para-
metric model in terms of selection and projection operators:  ΠX σ (r, f, φ).  As in the
definition of the selection operator, the “restricted to” clause limits the retrieval of a
tuple τ to the temporal element computed by φ(t).  Several examples of the select state-
ment will follow later in the paper.  
3.  Concept of user hierarchy in the parametric model  
In the previous section, we implicitly assumed that there is only one user for the
parametric model.  Such a user has access to the whole history, i.e., values in the data-
base during the entire time {t1,t2,⋅⋅⋅,tn}.  To facilitate a clear comparison with the
WSQ model, we must introduce the concept of a user hierarchy in the parametric
model.  
For the parametric model let’s now hypothesize multiple users.  Corresponding to
every user u, we formally associate a temporal element in {t1, t2, ⋅⋅⋅,tn}, called the
domain of u, denoted as Dom (u).  When a user u submits a query to a database, the
system automatically restricts the database to Dom(u) before processing the query.
Clearly, the set theoretic containment among users creates a partial order among users.
Formally, we say that users u1 is below u2 in the user hierarchy if and only if Dom(u1)
⊆ Dom(u2).  A user hierarchy is shown in Figure 4.     
The concept of user hierarchy was introduced in [GB89].  There a useful and elabo-
rate hierarchy has been given in a bitemporal model.  The following covers an interest-
ing example of users of the temporal model presented in the previous section.        
Example 4.  Imagine the temporal universe {1,2,⋅⋅⋅,NOW} also denoted as the interval
[0,NOW], where NOW is the current instant of time.  Now imagine that we have a data-
base used by a governmental agency, which declassifies information after 10 units of
time.  Consider the following community of users: system, public, analyzer, and classi-
cal with user domains [0,NOW], [0,NOW−10], [NOW−4,NOW], and {NOW}, respec-
tively.  The system user can see the whole information, the public can only see
Figure 4.  A user hierarchy for the parametric model
{t2, t3}
{t1, t2, t3}
{t2}
{t1, t2}
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specify its snapshots and its key.  In the following we assume that the key of r is K, and
the natural join is denoted as ◊.  
Operator Definition of Snapshot Designation of Key
Stored relation r r(t) Same as key of r
Union (e1 ∪ e2) (t) = e1(t) ∪ e2(t) Same as key of r and s 
Difference (e1 − e2) (t) = e1(t) − e2(t) Same as key of r and s 
Natural join (e1 ◊ e2) (t) = e1(t) ◊ e2(t) Union of keys of r and s
Projection (ΠX(e)) (t) = ΠX(e)(t) If K ⊆ X then K, else X
1-3-selection (σ (e, ,φ)) (t) = σ (e(t), ,φ(t)) Same as key of r, explained below
The definitions of union, difference, natural join (◊), projection and 1-3-selection1
given above are completely precise.2  As an example consider the definition of union.
(e1 ∪ e2) (t) = e1(t) ∪ e2(t), which shows how snapshots can be computed.  A snapshot
of the union (e1 ∪ e2) (t) is defined as e1(t) ∪ e2(t).  The latter is well defined as it is
essentially a union of two classical relations.  Thus, we have completely specified the
snapshots as well as the key of e1 ∪ e2.  Therefore, e1 ∪ e2 is well defined.  
The 1-3-selection σ (e, , φ) needs more explanation.  A 1-3-selection is a special
case of selection of the form σ (r, f, φ), to be discussed below.  In a 1-3-selection the
second argument is left blank, and it is the operator in the temporal database that is a
direct counterpart of the classical databases.  In the 1-3-selection σ (e, , φ), the parame-
ter φ is a domain expression.  An example of the 1-3-selection is σ (emp, ,
[[Dept = Toys]] ∪ [[Dept = Shoes]]).  In temporal databases, it is a counterpart of the
classical selection σ(emp, Dept = Toys ∨ Dept = Shoes).  
The general form of a selection is σ (r, f, φ).  It evaluates to {τ↓φ(τ): τ∈r, f (τ)  and
τ↓φ(τ) is not empty}.  If f evaluates to TRUE for a tuple, σ allows us to select only a
relevant part of it, which is specified by φ.  The key of σ (r, f, φ) is the same as the key
of r.3  
Example 3.  The query give information about employees while they were in Toys or
Shoes if they are currently employed can be expressed as follows:  
σ(emp, NOW ⊆ [[Name]],  [[Dept=Toys]] ∪ [[Dept=Shoes]])   •    
The parametric model also includes an operator that allows a user to change the key
of a relation [Ga88].  This operator has very interesting interaction with the selection
operator [GN93].  In this paper we will also use an SQL-like select statement for our
model.  It turns out that for a comparison with the WSQ model, only a simple form of
the select statement where the from list consists of a single relation will be needed.  In
other words, the select statement to be used in this paper is of the form given below:
1. The use of the term 1-3-selection is confined to this paper to make its relationship with
[WSQ94] clearer.  It is not a new operator in the parametric model.  
2. Note that the snapshot semantics of the relational operators given here is a theoretical
one.  A more pragmatic semantics of the relational operators can be given directly without
invoking the snapshots.  This point is dealt with in more detail in [Ga86].  
3. The definition of the full form of selection cannot be given in terms of snapshots [Ga88].  
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formed using temporal elements (e.g., {11,20} ∪ {31,40}), [[A]], [[AθB]], [[Aθb]], [[e]],
∪, ∩, complementation (unary −), and (binary) −, where A and B are attributes, b is a
constant and e is a relational expression.  If µ is a domain expression and τ is a tuple,
then µ (τ), resulting from the substitution of τ in µ, is a temporal element, and such
substitution can be defined in a natural way.  Following is an example of tuple substi-
tution.    
Example 2.  Consider the domain expression [[Salary = 80K]].  For a given tuple this
expression retrieves the time domain where salary is 80K.  Suppose τ is John's tuple in
Figure 2.  Then [[Salary = 80K]] (τ) evaluates to {t2}.  As another example, consider
the domain expression [[Salary = 80K]] ∩ − ([[Dept = Toys]] ∪ [[Dept = Shoes]]).  For a
given employee, this expression retrieves the time domain consisting of instants where
salary is 80K and the department is other than Toys or Shoes.  For John’s tuple, it eval-
uates to the empty set ∅.  • 
2.3. Boolean expressions
Boolean expressions are syntactic counterparts of boolean values TRUE and FALSE.
They are formed using µ ⊆ ν, where µ and ν are domain expressions.  More complex
expressions are formed using ∧, ∨, and ¬.  Note that expressions of the form µ = ν, µ ≠
ν, etc., can be derived using the above constructs.  If t is an instant of time, {t} ⊆ ν can
be written as t ∈ ν.  
2.4. Parametric syntactic forms [[AθB]] and AθB
We have already introduced the syntactic form [[AθB]] for the parametric model.  In
the parametric model the syntactic form AθB, without the use of [[⋅]], is given a differ-
ent meaning: AθB is defined to be an abbreviation for the boolean expression of the
form −([[AθB]] ⊆ ∅), which simply says that there is at least one instant of time where
A is in θ relationship with B.  Note that whereas [[AθB]] is a domain expression evalu-
ating to a temporal element, AθB is a boolean expression evaluating to TRUE or
FALSE.  Some important remarks about the parametric syntactic forms [[AθB]] and
AθB are now in order.
• The counterpart of the classical syntactic form AθB in the parametric model is the
parametric syntactic form [[AθB]] and not the syntactic form AθB.  
• One of the uses of the parametric syntactic form AθB is to identify objects.  For
example, “Name = John” is TRUE only for the first tuple in Figure 3.  
• In a snapshot at an instant t, the distinction between the parametric syntactic forms
[[AθB]] and AθB essentially disappears.  This is formalized in [BG93].  Therefore, the
syntax in the parametric model is a consistent extension of that in the classical model.    
2.5. Relational expressions
Before introducing relational operators, the concept of weak equality among rela-
tions must be defined.  Suppose r and s are relations over the same scheme.  Then r and
s are said to be weakly equal if r and s have the same snapshots, i.e., r(t) = s(t) for all
instants t.  It is easy to show that if two weakly equal relations have the same key, then
the relations are equal.  In other words, to specify a relation uniquely it is enough to
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key attributes.  Sometimes, the key attributes will be underlined for emphasis.  Figure
2 shows a database with a relation emp(Name Salary Dept) with Name as its key.  The
relation is a counterpart of the temporal relation of Figure 1(c) in the parametric
model.  
Now suppose r is a relation.  The domain of r, denoted [[r]], is defined as the union
of domains of all tuples in r, i.e. [[r]] = ∪τ ∈ r[[τ]].  Clearly, the domain of a relation is a
temporal element.  The restriction of r to temporal element µ, denoted r↓µ, is defined
in a natural manner.  The snapshot of r at an instant t, denoted r(t), is defined to be
r↓{t}.  [[emp]], the domain of the emp relation of Figure 2, is {t1,t2}.  The snapshot of
the emp relation at instant t2 is shown in Figure 3.  The timestamp is not shown in this
figure.  Because of the homogeneity assumption, the snapshot of a temporal relation is
isomorphic to a classical relation without nulls.  In the parametric model, a database
can be viewed as a parametrization of classical relations.  Note that neither [WSQ94]
nor this paper considers nulls.1   
Now let’s present an algebra for the homogeneous relations.  Our algebra includes
three types of expressions: domain expressions, which evaluate to temporal elements;
boolean expressions, which evaluate to boolean values (TRUE or FALSE); and rela-
tional expressions, which evaluate to relations.  These three types of expressions are
mutually recursive.    
2.2. Domain expressions
Domain expressions are the syntactic counterparts of temporal elements.  They are
1. [WSQ94] states: “Note that our formal treatment does not allow null values, just as or-
dinary relational algebra omits consideration of nulls.  Null values may be included in a for-
mal treatment by formalizing them in one of the many standard manners ...”  The same
remarks apply to the parametric model where the homogeneity assumption yields the coun-
terpart of classical relations without nulls.
             
Figure 2. emp relation of Figure 1(c) in the parametric model           
Figure 3. Snapshot of the emp relation at t = t2
Name Salary Dept
{t1,t2} John {t1} 50K{t2}  80K
{t1,t2} Toys
{t2,t3} Tom {t2,t3} 60K {t2,t3} Shoes
Name Salary Dept
John 80K Toys
Tom 60K Shoes
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Note that there are an unusually large number of footnotes.  Footnotes are necessary
to keep the main text as easy to read as possible.  However, let it be emphasized that
the footnotes are an important and integral part of this paper.  
2.  The parametric model for temporal databases 
The parametric model consists of a data type for time called temporal elements,
attribute values, associative navigation (AθB), tuples, and relations.  Our relations
require a key to be designated with them.  Finally, an algebra for the model will be
introduced.  The style of presentation is influenced by the need to make a clear com-
parison to the WSQ model.  
Let’s assume that the universe of time consists of instants {t1, t2, ⋅⋅⋅, tn}.  A temporal
element is defined to be a finite subset of T.  Note that no order properties are assumed
for the set T.1    
A temporal value of an attribute A is defined to be a function from a temporal ele-
ment into the domain of A.  A temporal value is also called an attribute value or sim-
ply a value.  An example of a temporal value of the attribute COLOR is 〈{t1} red, {t2}
blue〉.  [[A]] denotes the domain of a temporal value A.  Thus [[〈{t1} red, {t2} blue〉]] =
{t1,t2}.  A↓µ denotes the restriction of A to the temporal element µ.  
Our counterpart of the construct AθB for the relational model is [[AθB]], which is
defined to be {t: A and B are defined at t, and A(t)θB(t) is TRUE}, the set of instants
where A is in θ relationship to B.  [[AθB]] is a temporal element.  For example,
[[〈{t1,t3} red, {t2} blue〉 = 〈{t1,t2} blue〉]] = {t2}.  We also allow the construct [[Aθb]],
where b is a constant, which is evaluated by identifying b with the value 〈{t1, t2, ⋅⋅⋅, tn}
b〉. 
A homogeneous tuple τ over a scheme R is a function from R such that for every
attribute A in R, τ (A) is a temporal value of A and all the temporal values in the tuple
have the same domain.  Informally, we say that a tuple is a concatenation of temporal
values whose temporal domains are the same.  The assumption that all temporal values
in a tuple have the same domain make our tuples homogeneous.    
Suppose tuple τ is given.  Then the temporal domain of τ is the temporal domain of
any attribute and is denoted by [[τ]].  A tuple is said to be void if its domain is empty.  If
µ is a temporal element, τ↓µ is obtained by restricting each value in τ to the temporal
element µ.  
2.1. Relations  
Every set of tuples over a scheme R is not considered to be a relation.  A relation r
over a scheme R, with K⊆R as the key of r, is a finite set of non-void tuples such that
no key attribute value in a tuple changes with time, and no two tuples match in all their
1. In general the universe of time and temporal elements can be more complex.  For a clear-
er comparison with the WSQ model this simple definition suffices.  The main property
which encapsulate temporal elements is their closure under union, intersection, and com-
plementation.  
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• U-polyinstantiation.1  Under u-polyinstantiation it is assumed that a real world
object has the same key under all beliefs, although the nonkey values may vary.  For
example, Name of an employee would be the same in all beliefs, but varying beliefs
about salary and department may exist.  Because an object value may be different at
two instants of time or at two points in space, u-polyinstantiation is in a mathematical
sense a priori present in any model of temporal or spatial databases.  (See Figure 1(c).)  
• Key-polyinstantiation.  Key-polyinstantiation allows key as well as nonkey
attributes value to vary across beliefs.  Key-polyinstantiation subsumes u-polyinstanti-
ation.  The concept of a polykey, where an object may have several key values, was
introduced in [BG89,GB89,BG90]2 for temporal beliefs, and a brief discussion can be
found in [GN93].  A discussion of key-polyinstantiation is beyond the scope of this
paper.  The key-polyinstantiation in multilevel security has been covered in [CG95,
CG96].3   
U-polyinstantiation seems to be the only form of polyinstantiation in multilevel
security literature, where it is typically supported by having multiple tuples for a real-
world object (see Figure 1(b)).  As stated above, in a mathematical sense u-polyinstan-
tiation is a priori present in any model of temporal or spatial databases.  In some non-
1nf models, u-polyinstantiation is captured at the tuple level.  In addition, in the para-
metric model u-polyinstantiation is used as a keying mechanism for tuples: there is a
one-to-one correspondence between objects in the real world and the u-polyinstanti-
ated tuples.  A tuple, or the corresponding real world object, is identified by its uni-
key,4 the unique key value.  Because the parametric model captures u-polyinstantiation
at the tuple level rather than at the relation level, it seems to provide a cleaner frame-
work for multilevel security databases with u-polyinstantiation.   
In this paper we will consider [WSQ94] as a case study, and for this purpose we
term the model presented in there as the WSQ model.  This paper will focus on a com-
parison between the parametric and the WSQ frameworks for modeling and query of
multilevel security data.  The rest of this paper is organized as follows.  Section 2 gives
a brief introduction to the parametric model for temporal data.  A user hierarchy for the
parametric model is presented in Section 3.  Section 4 shows how to adapt the para-
metric model and the user hierarchy to multilevel security.  Section 5 introduces the
WSQ model for multilevel security.  Section 6 examines some characteristics of the
two models for multilevel security.  Section 7 exhaustively covers all queries in
[WSQ94] and shows that they can be expressed more naturally in the parametric
model.  The conclusions are presented in Section 8.  
1. The prefix “u-” in “u-polyinstantiation” may be seen as an abbreviation of “uni”, the term
“uni-polyinstantiation” would sound odd, therefore, we have coined the term “u-polyin-
stantiation”. 
2. To the best of our knowledge, the concept of key-polyinstantiation was first introduced
in [GB89], where no special term was used for it.  
3. Belief data is covered extensively in our works available in a series of six Technical Re-
ports of which [Ga97] serves as an index. 
4. The term unikey is used in this paper for brevity and also to make a clear distinction from
polykeys.  
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• On the day that the user at the upper level wants to leak the bit “0”, he/she does
nothing.  On the day the user at the upper level wants to leak the bit “1”, he/she inserts
a fictitious record for John in the morning and deletes the record in the evening.  
• Every afternoon, the user at the lower level tries to insert a (fictitious) record for
John.  On some days the insertion will go through, and on other days the system will
reject the insertion as a violation of the key.  If the insertion is confirmed by the sys-
tem, the user at the lower level assumes that the bit “1” has been sent to him/her by the
user at the upper level and the lower-level user deletes the record just inserted.  If the
system rejects the insertion, the user at the lower level assumes that the bit “0” has
been sent by the user at the upper level.   •      
Typically, in multilevel security literature the covert channel is avoided by adding a
“User-level” column to a relation so that the key is not just the Name attribute, but
rather “Name and User-level” attributes put together.  (See Figure 1(b).)  With this
arrangement, the system does not give an error message about duplication of a record.
For this solution, the term polyinstantiation has been coined: polyinstantiation means
the ability of a system to accommodate multiple beliefs about a real world object in the
database.  It turns out that there are two levels of polyinstantiation.  
                                      
(a) A classical relation with Name as its key        
(b) A multilevel security relation with Name User as its key      
(c) A temporal relation with similar mathematical content as (b) 
Figure 1. Polyinstantiation in multilevel security and temporal databases
Name Salary Dept
John 50K Toys
Tom 60K Shoes
Name User Salary Dept
John u1 50K Toys
John u2 80K Toys
Tom u2 60K Shoes
Tom u3 60K Shoes
Name User Salary Dept
John t1 50K Toys
John t2 80K Toys
Tom t2 60K Shoes
Tom t3 60K Shoes
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Abstract.  In a multilevel security database there are multiple beliefs
about a given real world object.  The ability of a database model to accommo-
date multiple beliefs is termed polyinstantiation in the multilevel security lit-
erature.  In this paper we remark that in an abstract sense polyinstantiation is a
priori present in all models for temporal and spatial databases.  In particular
we investigate the applicability of the parametric model for temporal data to
query multilevel security data and, as a case study, compare it to a model for
multilevel security given by Winslett, Smith, and Qian.     
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1.  Introduction
Several models for temporal data have been proposed for which [Ta+93] is an
excellent reference.  For the parametric model for temporal data that originated in
[Ga88], [GY88] provided the concept of a key, and [BG90] provided an SQL-like lan-
guage.  A summary of the parametric model given in [GN93] has also appeared in
[Ta+93].  A brief summary of the parametric model will also be given in this paper.  
Models for multilevel security have appeared in [BL75, CS95, DLS87, DLS88,
GQ95, HOT91, JS90, JS91, LDS90, SW92, WSQ94].  In multilevel security there is a
hierarchy of users or user levels, in which every user level has its own version of infor-
mation.  A user can see all information belonging to users at and below his/her level.
On the other hand, the information belonging to a higher user level, or even existence
of such information or such user levels, is held confidential from the lower user levels.
A model for a multilevel security database must be devoid of a sort of communication,
called a covert channel, which can lead to a compromise of the user confidentiality.  A
simplistic use of the classical first normal form database model, where every value is
atomic, is venerable to covert channels.  This is shown in the following example.  
Example 1.  Imagine a classical emp relation as in Figure 1(a) with Name as its key.
Postulate two user levels, upper and lower, and assume that John is known to be a fic-
titious person at both the user levels.  Everyday, a user at the upper level can leak one
bit, 0 or 1, of some secret message to a user at a lower level as follows:
